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LAWYERS AND GRATITUDE
REED ELIZABETH LODER*
INTRODUCTION
Gratitude might be a curious topic at a time that the public
maligns, even demonizes, lawyers. Asking lawyers to endure
social scorn and yet feel thankful seems a double insult. Yet, I
make the case in this article that every lawyer should cultivate,
feel, and act upon a special type of gratitude-call it legal
gratitude.
This discussion properly belongs to a larger, under-
emphasized effort to consider the meaning and relationship of
various traits of character and how they apply to lawyers.' Even
those legal ethicists who helpfully venture beyond codified ethics
rules and laws governing lawyers' ethics tend to take a predomi-
nantly action-oriented approach to legal ethics. They focus on
how lawyers should behave in specific situations and identify the
moral principles that should govern lawyer conduct.2 While such
non-positivist guidance on conduct is indispensable, it does not
represent a complete or nourishing ethical picture. Situation-
oriented legal ethics yields a haphazard picture of lawyer behav-
ior, and principle-based ethics of action supply at best a frag-
mented sense of a lawyer's moral identity. Combining action
ethics with an examination of character traits and their inter-rela-
tionship provides a more holistic perspective. This approach also
invites a more sustaining source of ethical inspiration to lawyers
themselves. The most meaningful context of ethics is not codi-
fied rules applied to stark dilemmas, but the daily gestures of
legal practice that reflect lawyers' intuitions and character. Grati-
tude is a vital strand of that web.
* Reed Elizabeth Loder is a professor at Vermont Law School. She holds
a Ph.D. in Philosophy and aJ.D. degree. Her writing is primarily in the areas of
legal and professional ethics. The author wishes to thankJesse Crary and Laura
Gordon for their creative research assistance with this project.
1. I am writing a book, Lawyers and Virtue, which will examine lawyer char-
acter more comprehensively, considering besides gratitude the virtues of integ-
rity, humility, courage, generosity, and just temperament.
2. Legal ethics casebooks take a problem or case approach that poses situ-
ations for students to analyze according to ethics codes and other sources of law
that address ethical conduct. Exceptions to the prevailing approach are Profes-
sors Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & RoB-
ERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAwYERs, CLIENTS AND MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
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Why study gratitude in particular? One substantive reason is
the centrality of the virtue to good character overall. A meta-
ethical reason is the heavily emotive nature of gratitude among
the virtues, which facilitates a shift in ethical perspective to the
inward lives of lawyers. Some virtuous traits unfold almost
entirely in action although they also have an emotive compo-
nent. For example, a generous person gives to improve the wel-
fare of others, and someone courageous puts herself in harm's
way to accomplish ends. Without the accompanying acts, feel-
ings of generosity and courage are not very meaningful, or for
that matter virtuous. In contrast, feelings and attitudes centrally
define gratitude. Even if a recipient never has an occasion to
reciprocate benefits received, virtue resides in her emotional
state of thankfulness and her readiness to return her bounty
should an opportunity arise. If she does manage to reciprocate,
of course, her action has higher moral worth than her feelings
alone and is a more reliable test of the sincerity and stability of
her thankful state of mind. Yet a grateful attitude shapes her
character even without direct responsive action. Gratitude is a
virtue with peculiar power. It affects how a person conceives the
world and expects others to behave. Gratitude increases inter-
personal receptivity. It seeps into one's being and affects all dis-
positions pervasively.
I also argue that people can control their gratitude perhaps
more than other virtuous emotions. They can induce and
encourage the feeling consciously and apply it outside of the
context of receiving some specific benefit. Cultivating gratitude
is an important way to improve overall moral sensibility. Risking
lawyer umbrage, I claim that gratitude is a particularly apt
response to being a lawyer.
I first consider the meaning of gratitude generally, not as
applied to lawyers. I discuss features of gratitude that some writ-
ers have identified and present my ideas on the virtue itself.
Then I relate gratitude to my own theory of moral development
and what I take to be the morally overarching trait of integrity.
Although individual instances of feeling grateful have episodic
value, I concentrate more on gratitude as an enduring tendency
or disposition.
By identifying gratitude as a moral virtue, I mean a charac-
teristic that is both intrinsically worthy and tends to promote the
welfare of others. The teleological dimensions of gratitude sub-
ject gratitude in particular circumstances to evaluation on the
basis of consequences despite the overall worth of the response.
Thus I consider gratitude's potential for moral harm or excess as
well as virtuosity. I discuss distortions and misapplications of
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gratitude in everyday life, and I argue that its relationship to
other virtues in part determines its worth in particular contexts.
Initially I consider the narrowest sense of gratitude as a
response to a specific benefit received and explore a recipient's
duty to reciprocate. Seeing that notion as overly restricted, I
focus on gratitude as broader and more diffuse. I am especially
interested in whether a grateful person owes anything to others
who have not bestowed favors and in gratitude as free-floating,
rather than attached to particular subjects and objects. In analyz-
ing gratitude, I draw primarily on works in philosophy and some
in psychology and religion.
In the second part of the paper, I turn to lawyers and grati-
tude, applying specific insights from the general inquiry and
developing a specialized concept of legal gratitude. I consider
the objects of lawyer gratitude-the things for which lawyers
might be grateful. I argue that lawyers should feel gratitude and
should consciously nurture the feeling. Part of this ethical sense
of gratitude includes a duty to reflect on ways the individual law-
yer can translate the emotion into a legal virtue that guides pro-
fessional life. Legal gratitude carries an obligation to scrutinize
the legal institutions that produce the conditions for which the
lawyer is grateful. Finally, I consider how lawyers and legal insti-
tutions might collectively cultivate and display gratitude.
I. WHAT GRATITUDE IS
Most who have considered gratitude see it as a response to
specific benefits bestowed by willing benefactors having a pur-
pose, at least in part, to improve the lot of selected recipients.3
The emotion involves a three-way relationship, no matter how
transitory, between a giver, taker, and an object that is a benefit
or service.4 Although gratitude is sometimes treated as a func-
tion of etiquette,5 those who have thought seriously about the
3. See, e.g., TERRANCE MCCONNELL, GRATITUDE 6, 8, 42 (1993); A.J. SiM-
MONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 168 (1979); Claudia Card,
Gratitude and Obligation, 25 Am. PHIL. Q. 115, 117 (1988); Michael E. McCul-
lough et al., Is Gratitude a Moral Affect?, 27 PSYCHOL. BULL. 249, 257 (2001);
A.D.M. Walker, Gratefulness and Gratitude, in 81 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOC'V 39, 48 (1981).
4. The thing or service provided does not necessarily have tangible value.
5. MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 4 (mentioning common tendency to con-
fuse gratitude with etiquette); see also Roy F. Baumeister & Stacey A. Ilko, Shal-
low Gratitude: Public and Private Acknowledgement of External Help in Accounts of
Success, 16 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191-92 (1995) (describing per-
functory public displays of thanks).
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idea consider it also to have moral content.6
Gratitude carries a moral obligation to repay a debt,
although the giver cannot demand repayment, 7 and the law can-
not require it. This is because gratitude is fundamentally an
emotive state, which cannot be coerced even though a person
lacking the feeling can carry out pretended acts as if he exper-
iences the emotion.8 Your mother reminds you on your eighth
birthday to thank Aunt Bea for the gift of a sweater. You think
the sweater hideous but dutifully comply. Over time you may
come to appreciate Aunt Bea's effort and generosity, but your
thanks did not reflect your attitude at the time.
A recipient in gratitude should attempt to return a favor if
circumstances provide an opportunity and he is in a position to
reciprocate.9 Although the beneficiary owes something in
return, he is not obligated to match the original gift precisely.' °
He can and should conceive repayment in flexible terms, consid-
ering the giver's interests and needs.'1 Nor must the debt be
paid promptly, if at all.' 2 Some have gone so far to say that a
hasty return is insulting and diminishes the original gift. 3 Thus,
the prevailing view is that gratitude is an action-oriented virtue,
charging a recipient to acknowledge a specific benefit with a
"thank you" at least 14 and to reciprocate further, if appropriate
and feasible, in the right manner to the right person.
6. MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 4, 7.
7. See, e.g., Fred R. Berger, Gratitude, 85 ETHICS 300, 306 (1975); Patrick
Fitzgerald, Gratitude and Justice, 109 ETHICS 119, 138 (1998).
8. Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 138.
9. E.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 69 (suggesting that benefactors
should be repaid if the chance arises).
10. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 302, 306 (suggesting that returning
equal benefit is not necessary).
11. See, e.g., Paul F. Camenisch, Gift and Gratitude in Ethics, 9 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 1, 11 (2001) (suggesting that repayment involving latitude should be
chosen); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, in
THE GIFT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 49, 58, 59 (Aafke E. Komter ed.,
1996).
12. See, e.g., Camenisch, supra note 11, at 11.
13. Aafke Elisabeth Komter, Gratitude and Gift Exchange, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF GRATITUDE 195, 208 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds.,
2004); Robert C. Roberts, Mental Health and the Virtues of Community: Christian
Reflections on Contextual Therapy, 19 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 319, 330 (1991).
But see ALBERT SCHWEITZER, A PLACE FOR REVELATION: SERMONS ON REVERENCE
FOR LIFE 122, 124 (David Larrimore Holland trans., 1988) (1919) (advising
against delaying gratitude).
14. Gratitude is more necessary for a large gift, especially one costly to
the giver. See, e.g., Abraham Tesser et al., Some Determinants of Gratitude, 9 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 233, 233 (1968).
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Few American philosophers have contested this essentially
quid pro quo feature of gratitude even as they have acknowl-
edged the indirection of giving back in terms of recipient, tim-
ing, and content. A notable exception is Patrick Fitzgerald, an
American philosopher who appeals to Buddhist ethics in arguing
that one can be grateful even for actions done not for one's wel-
fare but with the intention to harm or abuse. 5 Fitzgerald rea-
sons that the harmful consequences to the recipient of such
negatively motivated acts provide opportunities to learn and
occasions for compassion and moral growth-important steps on
a path toward Buddhist enlightenment. 6 Thus, gratitude is due.
This Buddhist-like view reminds us, first, that gratitude
should be approached multi-culturally and suggests, second, that
the virtue is broader than a tripartite relation among giver,
receiver, and benefit. Conceiving gratitude as an appropriate
response, even to malevolent acts, shifts attention from an
exchange relationship of indebtedness to the feelings and moral
development of the recipient quite independent of an initiating
actor. This shift helps to explain why gratitude is more a virtue
than a single act or obligation, since the heart and beliefs of a
responsive person matter more than the acts and intentions of a
benefactor.
Although I do not accept Fitzgerald's stark severance of the
recipient's feeling from the original doer's emotions, his focus
on the receiving person is helpful in plumbing gratitude as a vir-
tue, rather than a social and cultural response. Indeed, once
properly liberated from a relationship of exchange, I think the
concept of gratitude should expand and disperse into a kind of
free-floating disposition that is unattached to any particular gift
or giver. Many religions conceive of gratitude as due to God for
the whole of creation.17 Although that expansion permits thank-
fulness for an extremely large and abstract array of gifts, indeed,
everything there is, it is still tied to particular relations between a
person and her God. I would further divest some types of grati-
tude from any giver at all and consider diffuse thankfulness
15. Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 119-20.
16. Id. at 124-25. See also Robert A. Emmons & Cheryl A. Crumpler, Grat-
itude as a Human Strength: Appraising the Evidence, 19 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
56, 66-67 (2000) (discussing gratefulness as a tool for learning to deal with
adversity).
17. See, e.g., K.L. Seshagiri Rao, Bhakti and the Spirit of Thanksgiving, in
SPOKEN AND UNSPOKEN THANKS: SOME COMPARATIVE SOUNDINGS 36 (John B. Car-
man & FrederickJ. Streng eds., 1989) (discussing Hindu gratitude); Muzammil
H. Siddiqi, Thanksgiving in Islamic Thought, in SPOKEN AND UNSPOKEN THANKs,
supra, at 146 (discussing gratitude in Islam).
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appropriate for no being or thing in particular. Although one
might object that such an expansive notion is vacuous, I do not
believe such diffusion dilutes gratitude or divests it of meaning.
On the contrary, I contend that pervasive and unattached grati-
tude is the highest form of the virtue-its apex. At this point,
gratitude saturates all of one's attitudes and activities and
becomes deeply infused in one's overall character.18
An implication of this idea of diffuse or free-floating grati-
tude is that the emotion can apply to abstractions like groups,
ideas, and processes. Those who confine gratitude to a particular
reciprocal relation will not accept the possibility of collective
gratitude, nor easily accept gratitude toward collectives, let alone
gratitude for abstractions like ideas or experiences such as appre-
ciating the natural world. They will reject the view that a group,
like a profession, has a special duty of gratitude as a collective
that is independent of individual professional duties conglomer-
ated. They also will resist the idea of thankfulness to groups,
arguing that gratitude to a group is simply a shorthand way of
expressing gratefulness to individuals taken in the aggregate. 9 I
maintain that people can be grateful even to a loosely organized
group itself, say a political party, without being able to identify
changing members distinctly, or without even feeling especially
indebted to particular, prominent individuals who compose the
group.2" The total experience of affiliation and belonging in
that setting may prompt the emotion and sustain the party mem-
bers' loyalty through some disappointing times. The duties of
reflection that I claim properly accompany gratitude mean, how-
ever, that gratitude does not have a permanent grace period.
I also contend that a group itself, as a loose and dynamic
collective, may owe gratitude to a particular benefactor or, more
expansively, to those constituencies who make possible the insti-
tution's existence. A political party in disrepute must not treat
casually the loyalty of its constituents. Collective gratitude is only
metaphorically analogous to personal gratitude because an insti-
tution is incapable of feeling and emoting, and direct reciprocity
18. Religious views of gratitude sometimes express such pervasive grati-
tude. See, e.g., Ronald Goetz, Gratitude for Everything, 114 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
689, 689 (1997).
19. See, e.g., A.D.M. Walker, Political Obligation and the Argument from Grati-
tude, 17 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 191, 196-97 (1988).
20. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGA-
TIONS 187-89 (1979).
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is not possible. Yet, in my view, these features do not remove
gratitude as a feature of collective character.21
What I have called free-floating gratitude may originate in
particular acts of beneficence, but it more aptly applies to a series
or complex of events that themselves seem insignificant, but over
time accumulate into a generalized, indivisible sense of grati-
tude. As these moments become a stream, memory and the abil-
ity to trace thanks to particular persons and occasions fade. This
holistic response is an important component of gratitude as a
virtue rather than an episodic emotional response. It permits the
object and content of grateful expressions to be as open-ended as
the feeling.
No precise reciprocity can be demanded of a person so dif-
fusely disposed to feel gratitude. Seeing gratitude as a specific
response actually may detract from its sustaining power as a vir-
tue. Psychological experiments have shown that positive sef-per-
ceptions of character ebb when one perceives external
explanations for behavior.22 A person tends to attribute his moti-
vations to external causes like incentives or sanctions rather than
to inward sources like generosity or gratitude.23 This outward
expectation actually diminishes motivation in future instances
that involve no outside reward or sanction.24 If gratitude must
link to specific beneficial actions, it may be shallow and fleeting
in its particularity and thus less than virtuous. An exclusively ego-
istic view of gratitude, and for that matter human nature, reaps
its own prophecy in self-interest.
Before considering the full dimensions of gratitude as an
enduring character trait, it is important to probe the common
understanding that even sporadic gratitude is a feeling of moral
significance. 25  People regularly condemn someone who has
received a gift for failing to express thanks and demonstrate grat-
itude.26 Exceeding the mother's admonitions to be grateful to
Aunt Bea for the sweater are the lamentations of parents to their
21. I will develop this view more fully in The Moral Personalities of Legal
Groups, a work currently in progress.
22. See, e.g., Mark R. Lepper et al., Undermining Children's Interest with
Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the "Ovejustification" Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALrrY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129 (1973).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 130.
25. E.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 298 (describing gratitude as a moral feel-
ing despite its lack of attention in philosophy).
26. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 518 (Ernest C. Mosser
ed., 1985) (1740) (calling ingratitude "the most horrid" human crime); IMMAN-
UEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 218 (Lewis Infield trans., 1930) (calling ingrati-
tude "vileness"); SCHWEITZER, supra note 13, at 114 (calling ingratitude "evil").
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child, "You don't appreciate the sacrifices we have made to send
you to college." Although such statements are familiar, they
seem paradoxical upon analysis. People normally ascribe moral
responsibility only to events within a person's control, and feel-
ings are not typically thought to be in that category.27 It is not
uncommon, for example, to hear someone say, "He can't help
how he feels." Even more familiar and accepted would be the
comment, "You can't expect to change the way he feels." In con-
trast, people regularly hold others accountable for their actions,
sometimes justifying even severe social sanctions such as impris-
onment. We do not punish people for their thoughts, short of
action, no matter how malevolent. "Ought implies can" is the
moral philosopher's expression capturing the policy notion that
it is inappropriate to make moral judgments about matters
beyond a person's capacity.
28
Applying these ideas to gratitude, we might frown on some-
one who fails to appreciate gifts and expect that person to pre-
tend thankfulness to spare the feelings of the giver. We would
view the recipient's lack of gratitude as an emotional deficit more
like a sickness than a subject for rational persuasion. While a
person can decide to take action in response to a benefit, the
argument would go, that person cannot force the feeling of grati-
tude itself and thus cannot be accountable for the affective void.
This separation of feeling and action presents a significant
ethical obstacle to my view that people (and lawyers) should feel
gratitude, so I must make the case that people are responsible for
their feelings and emotions as well as their actions. 29 Responsi-
bility for emotional responses is a hurdle not just for gratitude,
but for all moral emotions. One might say, for example, that a
spiteful person is not accountable for the sentiment of spite but
only for actions taken to express the sentiment in harmful ways.
Confining one's spite to a private sphere and refraining from
spiteful redress is all one can expect morally, according to this
view.
Although I grant that acting spitefully is more reprehensible
than feeling spite, I believe one can evaluate the feeling itself
and, more importantly for morality, that a person can identify,
27. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 306 (describing the traditional view
that feelings are not part of moral duty); Camenisch, supra note 11, at 8 (dis-
cussing problems with imposing duties to feel a certain way).
28. See OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM 33-35, 43, 46 (1991) (arguing for realistic moral the-
ory acknowledging psychological constraints).
29. 1 use the term "feeling" to refer to a sporadic response, whereas an
"emotion" is a set of feelings shaped by background attitudes and beliefs.
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scrutinize, and successfully attempt to alter such feelings in her-
self. The spiteful person first must be able to recognize the trait
of spite in others and assess the weakness and potential for harm
in that emotion. Such judgments occur frequently and fairly eas-
ily. The more difficult hurdle is confronting spite in oneself.
This means overcoming powerful tendencies toward self-decep-
tion and evasion of personal frailties. Once acknowledged, a
reflective person must consciously decide not to act on her spite-
ful feelings, which requires self-discipline. Harder still is the
effort to resist the feeling itself. Mere suppression will not do
since the goal is to reconstitute the affective responses them-
selves. This involves such measures as identifying and reconsid-
ering specific beliefs that support spiteful responses, avoiding
situations likely to precipitate spite, and learning ways to reject or
at least suppress the feeling when it does arise.30
Given entrenched behavioral habits and webs of familiar
relations, a person cannot expect to eradicate such feelings easily
or even completely. Because of these difficulties, she is less
responsible for lingering negative emotions than for acting on
her spite. Yet, she is not absolved altogether for persisting emo-
tional predilections. She has duties to identify her emotions, to
examine the influences that led to her affective dispositions, to
consider harms to herself and others from harboring such feel-
ings, and finally to approach susceptible situations with these
reflections as guides.
II. A Theory of Moral Integrity
I contend that at least some of a person's feelings are subject
to moral assessment despite the undeniable effect that culture
and personal background have on personal makeup. I acknowl-
edge that shaping forces are difficult to identify and evaluate
without employing standards that are themselves embedded in a
social framework, thus limiting self-reinvention.31 Yet, my com-
fort with the notion that feelings are subject to moral appraisal
builds on my larger view of moral development and integrity.
A moral person, in my view, is essentially reflective.32 Some-
times he must wrestle with moral conflicts in a world short of
30. Cognitive therapy and spiritual practices are two methods to alter
beliefs and responses that accompany negative emotions.
31. LARRY MAY, THE SoctALLY RESPONSIVE SELF: SocL THEORY AND PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS 15-18 (1996) (questioning choice free of social influence).
32. This does not mean that being moral implies being deliberative at all
times, or that moral people have thought consciously about the foundations of
morality. Perhaps moral exemplars are most admired because doing the right
thing comes reflexively, without temptation. Indeed, a character-based
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information and predictability, even if the majority of his moral
decisions are made intuitively and with relative ease. At times of
doubt, the best justified moral path is frequently a close question
rather than bell-ringing truth. This moral predicament is essen-
tially "epistemic," involving a problem of knowledge and justifica-
tion. Because of such ambivalent but defining moments, the
moral person perpetually teeters between moral commitment
and uncertainty, suspended epistemically between moral truths
and nagging skepticism about moral judgments and principles.3"
I conceive moral integrity as an overarching state of dynamic
equilibrium between these epistemic poles.
A person reaches this fragile state of integral equipoise in
part through refining moral reasoning, but also by developing
affective skills like empathy and moral imagination that enable
her to invite and scrutinize diverse perspectives. Suspended
between moral confidence and skepticism, she employs these
capacities to test her own ideas and attitudes. She approaches
others receptively and applies her imagination to glimpse moral
insights and feelings that challenge her own. Pressing her imagi-
nation tends to swell her tolerance and understanding of foreign
perspectives, even if she emerges from challenge without
accepting the other's novel ideas and with reinforced moral com-
mitments of her own. She recognizes that her faculties of per-
sonal expansion are ever imperfect, however, and part of her
epistemic predicament is to avoid merely projecting her own val-
ues onto another while pretending to understand the other.34
She realizes she is caught inside of her own perspective even as
she consciously tries to enter other worlds and to enlarge her
own. This struggle is endemic to morality, and although episte-
mic anguish subsides in the person of integrity, it never disap-
pears altogether.
Integrity requires supporting virtues of care, courage, grati-
tude, and humility to achieve its characteristic state of balance.
Only a courageous and humble person, who cares for others and
their insights and cares about the state of her own moral person-
approach suggests that moral habits and dispositions are more valuable than
isolated decisions. The philosopher Owen Flanagan makes a similar point
about some "godly peasant" characters in Dostoevsky's novels. FLANAGAN, supra
note 28, at 143-44.
33. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 841, 853-54 (2002); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Out From Uncertainty: A
Model of the Lauyer-Client Relationship, 2 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 89, 117-19 (1993).
34. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False
Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REv. 61, 70-71 (1996) (describing how lawyers project their
own values onto clients).
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ality, will invite self-assessment and change. A grateful person
will appreciate the rewards of this challenge and will tap the
incentive to expand even further despite some discomfort.
Does this path to moral development imply that a person is
obligated to improve her own character? Philosophical literature
considers the issue of duties to oneself, with some authors pro-
claiming the confusion in such a view35 and others embracing
the notion. 6 My view of moral integrity implies that deliberate
attention to assessing and building one's own character is intrin-
sically valuable, if not a moral requirement. I link integrity to the
moral motivation to conceive and cultivate a better self. While
such motivation does not drive everyone, I believe that it can be
encouraged deliberately and marks a particularly worthy self.
Gratitude both emerges from and supports an integral state.
It links the self to others who make growth possible, but it also
infuses the process itself that enables the person to become
someone better than the character she happens to be.37 The
person of integrity recognizes great fortune in having this human
ability to aspire to a better self, and she is grateful for this pre-
cious opportunity. In defining a character ideal, the person
adopts an emotional and attitudinal template at least as much as
she decides upon patterns of conduct. She sets out to define and
nurture an idealized emotive disposition which, over time, will
evolve. As socially embedded, she inevitably meets mixed suc-
cess, but she feels empowered to change not only how she acts,
but how she emotes and develops as a moral personality. That
identity has gratitude as a significant motivator and trait.
For all of these reasons, I maintain that holding a person
responsible for moral emotions does not violate the "ought
implies can" principle. Although resistant feelings may linger, a
person is responsible for assessing and trying to improve her own
moral affect, the moral identities of the communities to which
she belongs involuntarily, and those to which she subscribes by
choice. She can employ reflective resources of imagination and
35. See, e.g., KURT BATER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF
ETHICS 215, 231 (1958); Marcus G. Singer, On Duties to Oneself, 69 ETHICS 202,
203 (1959) (arguing no duty without correlative right).
36. See, e.g., Lara Denis, Kant's Ethics and Duties to Oneself, 78 PAc. PHIL. Q.
321, 338-43 (supporting Kantian duties to oneself as involving respect for
human rationality); William Neblett, Morality, Prudence, and Obligations to Oneself,
80 ETHICS 70, 70-71 (arguing that morality involves duties to all humans,
including oneself).
37. See Frederick J. Streng, Gratitude and Thankful Joy in Indian Buddhism,
in SPOKEN AND UNSPOKEN THANKS, supra note 17, at 43, 51-52 (cherishing the
path by which one reached enlightenment).
2006]
186 NOTRE. DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
empathy, clumsily at first but eventually with greater ease and
regularity, to expand and refine her moral sensibilities. Over a
lifetime, a person can recalibrate her emotive patterns, as well as
her deeds, and actively foster those social circumstances that will
be more likely to produce the emotional responses that she con-
cludes have moral worth.
Gratitude becomes part of character in a person who is dis-
posed to appreciate experience and feel thankful on regular
occasions.38 This inclination emerges both spontaneously and
from the conscious moral development process I have described.
The closer one progresses toward integrity, the more this deliber-
ative process becomes habitual and reflexive as the person
acquires a reflective and integral character. The wise person
consciously explores the perspectives of others out of respect for
human potentiality. He then feels grateful for the novel input
that enables him to stretch his moral framework on the way to
perfecting his own moral personality. Ideally, this receptivity
becomes second nature over time, and the person at least ini-
tially approaches all interpersonal encounters with thankful
expectation. At this point, gratitude has become a virtue rather
than a sporadic response to events.
This is not the culmination of gratitude, however. The inte-
gral person ultimately adopts a grateful attitude that pervades
her life. She feels generalized gratitude for the possibility of
moral development itself and for all of the gifts of daily experi-
ence, encompassing even more distant connections with the non-
human natural world and abstract ideas.
It may appear so far that gratitude is an instrumental idea, a
means to greater ends.39 That is, a person seeks to attract grate-
ful feelings because she hopes to expand her moral horizons. The
people with whom she interacts, and her responses to them, thus
seem to serve indulgent moral ambitions. Although this kind of
moral egoism does imbue the moral development process, ego-
ism is hardly a pure or exclusive motivation. A person seeks out
others in imagination and empathy out of respect for them
intrinsically as humans. Otherwise, their input would not be
attractive or valuable. Her purest gratitude is a response to their
value perceived as inherent rather than a means.
38. Social psychologists corroborate the moral disposition. See Michael E.
McCullough et al., The Grateful Disposition: A Conceptual and Empirical Topography,
82J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 112, 112 (2002) (describing a disposition to
respond with gratitude).
39. At first sight, thanksgiving also has instrumental value in some Bud-
dhist thought. "Thankful joy" is a blessing one earns on a path to enlighten-
ment or spiritual achievement. Streng, supra note 37, at 51-52.
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III. MISPLACED GRATITUDE
Despite the general virtuosity of gratitude, gratitude some-
times has moral flaws. Aristotle insisted that virtues be exercised
in the right circumstances and the right degree.4" Virtues
depend upon practical, or contextual, judgment to guard against
excesses or deficiencies in particular applications.4' Hitting Aris-
totle's "golden mean" is not an average of extremes, but a matter
of concrete and particular judgment that improves with experi-
ence.42 This idea of the mean is relevant to gratitude, even
though Aristotle himself considered gratitude as more of a weak-
ness than a virtue.
Gratitude is sometimes an inappropriate response to partic-
ular events. The political loyalty discussed earlier can outlive
grace if troubled times yield to a pattern of unjustified policies
and action. In the extreme, a person can be grateful for injustice
and social evil. Charles M. Shelton uses the example of white
Southerners' appreciation for their cultural traditions, including
slave-based plantation life and later segregation.44 An extreme
contemporary analogue is a suicide bomber's deep gratitude for
the heavenly rewards of violent sacrifice. On a more abstract
plane, non-psychopathic extremists sometimes appeal gratefully
to principles or causes tojustify radical acts. An ecosaboteur, for
example, can inflict harm to property or persons in thankful
devotion to preserving biodiversity. Although appreciating the
diversity of life is a positive emotion, the conduct expressing that
attitude is morally questionable. Misplaced gratitude in part
motivates such examples of extremism. Victims of violence and
aggression sometimes also experience gratitude either qualita-
tively misplaced or present in the wrong degree. The "Stock-
holm syndrome" phenomenon refers to crime victims, often
hostages or prisoners, who acquire sympathy and gratitude for
their captors.45 Abuse victims also may feel inappropriate emo-
40. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 33 (David Ross trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1980).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Robert C. Roberts, Character Ethics and Moral Wisdom, 15 FAITH &
PHIL. 478, 495 (1998) (describing Aristotle's insistence on self-sufficiency).
44. Charles M. Shelton, Gratitude: Considerations from a Moral Perspective, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 259, 271 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E.
McCullough eds., 2004).
45. For example, Patty Hearst experienced such a shift. See FLO CONWAY
& JIM SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING: AMERICA'S EPIDEMIC OF SUDDEN PERSONALITY
CHANGE 206-10 (2d ed. 2005).
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tions toward their victimizers, which can include thanks for the
cruel discipline exerted.46
Milder grateful responses also can be misplaced. For exam-
ple, one might sincerely thank a person who bestows favors or
gifts without recognizing the giver's malevolent motive to manip-
ulate and control the recipient. Gratitude for unwanted gifts can
also be inappropriate. Forcing Grandmother's wedding dress on
a young bride who has expressed her preference to choose her
own garment is one example. Presenting a known vegetarian
with a Thanksgiving turkey is another. Of course, sometimes
well-intended but unwanted gifts properly precipitate gratitude.
The guest who brings meat to dinner deserves thanks if he deliv-
ers the food without being aware of the host's vegetarianism. On
the other hand, such a guest is remiss if he deliberately ignores
clues about his host's eating habits to indicate scorn for a vegeta-
rian lifestyle. A gift presented contemptuously, carelessly, or with
reckless ignorance does not bind the recipient to grateful feel-
ings or actions.
In short, gratitude is not an absolute virtue despite its gener-
ally valuable features. The particular genesis and consequences
of gratitude are morally relevant. It is not positive for an obse-
quious, naive, or victimized recipient to feel thankful for gifts
designed to manipulate, dominate, or ultimately harm. Deter-
mining the appropriate responses to offerings requires contex-
tual moraljudgment, which can err. Despite this, a recipient can
perfect her judgment over time and learn from experiences of
misplaced gratitude. She can examine a giver's motives more
accurately the next time around and be more sensitive to the
context of giving. This refined judgment can change behavior as
well, as it frees one from accepting certain offers that raise
qualms, and from reciprocating for tainted gifts. The person dis-
posed to feel grateful learns to recognize faulty expressions of
beneficence based on motives like mockery, dominance, or
humiliation.4 7 Moral principle and virtue unite in the assess-
ment and reform of gratitude.
Deficiencies of gratitude in a recipient's response are proba-
bly more prominent than excessive gratitude for ill-motivated
gifts. Tellingly, people across diverse cultures and religions con-
demn lack of gratitude harshly, which surely suggests that the
46. See Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 145 (describing several inappropriate
responses to abusers).
47. On the other hand, a Buddhist-like response would be finding value
in the test a malicious giver provides. See Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 119-20.
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meaning of gratitude reaches far beyond politeness.48 Some
thinkers link common insufficiencies of gratitude to human fears
of dependency and vulnerability.49 They attribute widespread
reticence about feeling and giving thanks to apprehension about
the loss of freedom from indebtedness and dependence. Others
tie cultural deficiencies in gratitude more benignly to mere over-
sights and delayed expressions of the emotion.5" At the same
time, some insist that expressions of gratitude are somehow
unseemly if they occur too rapidly after a generous act.5 This
suggests that the timing of a grateful response is morally relevant
and delicate.
Harsh responses to ingratitude reflect its importance in
most moral schemes. Varied traditions agree on the central role
gratitude plays in social and religious relations. Sociologist
George Simmel called gratitude, "the moral memory of man-
kind."52 Adam Smith said that gratitude is "the sentiment which
most immediately and directly prompts us to reward . ... "
Relations of debt and reciprocity are the glue of society, accord-
ing to some.54 They suggest that social relations rely essentially
on basic gratitude. 5 Because of this centrality, regular ingrati-
tude is a vice in both individuals and cultures. The virtue has
personal as well as collective dimensions.
This judgment of moral import is sound. The emotion is a
core motivator for moral development resembling the process I
have sketched. Respect is a somewhat cool response to others.
While it partly drives the moral person's search for interpersonal
encounters that challenge moral assumptions, respect does not
completely explain the attachment and affection that cement
many moral relations. Gratitude better accomplishes this direct,
emotional connection. It also helps to explain why feeling thank-
ful for non-human nature involves a sense of deep relationship
with foreign worlds. Similarly, although more abstractly, grati-
48. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 4.
49. See, e.g., Camenisch, supra note 11, at 5-6; Roberts, supra note 43, at
494.
50. See SCHWEITZER, supra note 13, at 120-22.
51. See Roberts, supra note 13; Komter, supra note 13, at 208.
52. George Simmel, Faithfulness and Gratitude, in THE GIR: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 39, 45.
53. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 68 (D.D.
Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759).
54. See Gouldner, supra note 11, at 49-66 (discussing reciprocity as a sta-
bilizing force); Simmel, supra note 52, at 40, 44 (claiming gratitude is necessary
for social cohesion).
55. See Gouldner, supra note 11, at 49-66.
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tude for concepts and principles manifests in deeply committed
beliefs and attitudes that directly govern behavior.
Gratitude is also closely related to moral risk. Questioning
moral attitudes and beliefs invites upheaval and puts one's cur-
rent moral personality on the line. Because gratitude acknowl-
edges dependence on others and personal fragility, it facilitates
the moral openness, humility, and courage that are necessary for
personal growth despite some anguish related to struggle. Grati-
tude fosters a reflective temperament and fights a settled, dog-
matic disposition. Thus it nurtures the epistemic suspension
between moral truth and skepticism that I have treated as a mark
of integrity. Gratitude feeds other virtues that also involve risks.
It spurs the courage necessary to challenge oneself, the humility
required to try, and the care that solidifies moral relations.
IV. LAWYERS AND GRATITUDE
A. The Issues
Assessing the meaning of gratitude for lawyers raises many
questions. For what should lawyers as a group feel grateful, if
anything? If gratitude is appropriate, do countervailing circum-
stances ever overpower or cancel it? Is misplaced gratitude possi-
ble for lawyers, and if so, how does a lawyer gauge appropriate
gratitude? How, if at all, should lawyers express their thanks?
Should professional institutions foster gratitude, and if so, what
specific measures would be useful?
B. The Everyday Objects of Gratitude and Ingratitude
Lawyers do not have it easy in these times. They are dispar-
aged perhaps more than ever before ,56 even to the point of vio-
lence against particular lawyers.57 On the public policy level,
politicians blame lawyers for everything from high medical (and
other consumer) costs and physician attrition to a general cul-
ture of non-accountability for conduct, and some earnestly seek
to eviscerate legal efficacy through the guise of specific remedies
like tort reform.5' Economically, lawyers face increasing compe-
tition to find employment and increasing pressure to retain
56. See Thomas W. Overton, Comment, Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Dead
Snakes: The Lawyer Joke as Societal Text, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1069, 1091-92 (1995)
(discussing special modern disdain for lawyers despite perennial complaints).
57. See Stephen Kelson, Violence Against Lawyers, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 197,
198-200 (1998).
58. Such discussions of caps on malpractice judgments and reductions in
class action litigation polarize society and turn the public against lawyers and
their clients.
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employment-even at the partnership or other high level of stat-
ure.59 Younger lawyers feel constrained by tight employment
markets and growing educational debt.6" They also are morally
pinched. Workplace conditions are disheartening for lawyers
despite sometimes plush surroundings. Colleagues receive and
bestow little loyalty as they change positions ever more frequently
in a career.6' Long hours under pressure are commonplace,62
and the work ethic of the profession interferes with human flour-
ishing at the basic level of childrearing and certainly in avoca-
tions." Younger lawyers feel constrained by the hierarchical
structure of many legal workplaces and the fragmented work
assignments that are not conducive to building significant client
relationships.64 More than ever, lawyers are at least somewhat
dissatisfied with their work, and a troubling many regret their
choice of profession, some to the point of fleeing the law.65 This
bleak picture hardly warrants gratitude, some would assert with
plausibility.
So why should lawyers feel thankful? In the classic, narrow
view of gratitude as a sense of obligation for a beneficent act,
some direct benefits justify acts in return. Even before gradua-
tion, law students may feel indebted to particular teachers who
have been particularly helpful, influential, or inspiring. Honor-
ing one's teachers is a vital component of gratitude in many cul-
tures.66 Some law graduates are fortunate to become law clerks
for judges for a year or several, and that experience frequently
leaves the former clerk with enduring appreciation for the les-
sons, care, and guidance of a particular judge. Once in practice,
59. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 274, 277-78, 284-85, 304, 314 (1993) (discussing economic
pressures).
60. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 898,
935-36 (1999).
61. KRONMAN, supra note 59, at 277, 279; Schiltz, supra note 60, at 903.
62. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 59, at 281, 302-07.
63. See generally Stephen Gillers, The Case of Jane Loring-Kraf!: Parent, Law-
yer, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115 (1990).
64. See KRONMAN, supra note 59, at 2-3, 288-89 (discussing diminished
fulfillment in the legal profession and diminished opportunity to view client's
problem as a whole).
65. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, YOUNG LAwYERs Div., THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1990, at 81 (1991) (reporting dissatisfaction "by lawyers in all posi-
tions . . .in firms of all sizes."); Schiltz, supra note 60, at 881-82 (discussing
lawyer studies revealing unhappiness).
66. See, e.g., Aaron Levine, Hakkarot Hatov (Gratitude) and the Moral Person-
ality, 25 TRADITION 42, 46-47 (1990) (discussing gratitude toward parents and
educators).
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mentorship continues in many workplaces.67 Despite competi-
tion, social and professional support is accessible formally and
informally in various group affiliations and relationships.68
Small courtesies matter much in the stressful atmosphere of
practice. The Clerk of Court who reminds a lawyer of a deadline,
the colleague who lends expertise and insight to a case, the law-
yer whose brief provides a model of excellence, the intern or
paralegal who discovers the recent unreported case, the secretary
who corrects the overlooked misspelling, the client willing to
ignore a few unreturned phone calls, and even the opponent
who is flexible about scheduling court dates to permit a much
needed vacation all deserve at least a "thank you." Without such
small kindnesses, otherwise unrelieved competition and daily
pressure might be unbearable.
C. Core Legal Gratitude
Although these moments are meaningful to a lawyer, they
are not the core of professional gratitude. Such events may be
more welcome in the life of a lawyer than in less demanding
employment, but they are the kind of niceties that anyone might
expect. For gratitude to emanate from the essence of being a
lawyer, something broader and deeper must be involved. Here is
where diffuse gratitude matters. I have argued that gratitude as a
response to small acts of beneficence can accumulate over time
into a complex, overarching response irreducible to particular
components. Thankfulness to the law teacher, judge, or other
mentor may merge into a general feeling of gratitude for the
mentoring process, for example. This convergence does not
diminish gratitude toward the individuals themselves, but genera-
lized gratitude does acquire a life of its own through the accumu-
lated contributions mentoring has made to one's skills and
proficiencies as a lawyer. The lawyer becomes a "steward" of
knowledge and skill and acquires obligations to use and not
waste those bounties.6" Similarly, casual and daily support from
legal groups or individuals generates a broad sense of thankful-
ness for social exchange and camaraderie despite fierce eco-
nomic competition.
Besides the peers who bestow benefits, more abstract advan-
tages privilege lawyers in society despite cultural disparagement
67. See Schiltz, supra note 60, at 918, 927.
68. For example, local and state Bar Associations include support groups,
and the popular Inns of Court programs provide relaxed and collaborative set-
tings for lawyers to communicate outside of the work context.
69. See Camenisch, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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of the profession. The cliches about lawyers and gatekeepers
holding "keys to the courthouse" are relevant here. ° At a mini-
mum, lawyers acquire knowledge and skills that enable them to
"work" complex systems both with craft and cultural ease. 7 ' This
serves them first of all as individuals who may need to avail them-
selves of law at times.
This proficiency also grants lawyers influence over lay clients
who do not possess the magic words or skills to maneuver legally,
and who often come to a lawyer reluctantly and out of pressing
need. 2 Combining this resource asymmetry with the central
importance of law in society, a formula for advantage emerges.
Lawyers enjoy at least a theoretical power imbalance, enabling
them to guide and sometimes control and manipulate lay per-
sons, especially those most needy.73 Here an objector could
mention demographic conditions that disserve lawyers and slash
their power, such as intense economic competition, increasing
career mobility, the trend toward one-shot lawyer-client relation-
ships, and increasing specialization.7 ' The objector also could
insist that the many lawyers who work for organizations like cor-
porations do not tend to form the kind of personal client rela-
tionships that are most conducive to professional dominance,
and that such lawyers lack autonomy within hierarchical
workplaces.75
Although such factors do dilute the powers of lawyers, they
do not counteract the fundamentally asymmetric lawyer and cli-
ent relationship. Lawyers possess insider knowledge and skill
that increase their control over all clients, including sophisti-
cated individuals who compose client organizations. Legal
knowledge also can improve lawyers' own lives and create many
opportunities to progress in society. Not to recognize these privi-
leges is an example of professional ingratitude that can be
70. See RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFES-
SIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 28
(1989).
71. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense,
a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615-16; Richard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. Rrs. 1, 1 n.1
(1975).
72. See Pepper, supra note 71, at 615-16.
73. See Wasserstrom, supra note 71, at 22.
74. See KRONMAN, supra note 59; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30-68 (1988) (examining institutional factors limit-
ing lawyer independence).
75. See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503, 509-21
(1985) (examining large Chicago law firms).
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judged and condemned. To recognize these gifts, on the other
hand, properly results in thankfulness for one's social and per-
sonal privileges, analogous to, and greater than, the gratitude
that some have argued a citizen should feel toward a generally
just state.76 Whereas citizens owe gratitude to their government
for general belonging and public benefits, the lawyer owes spe-
cial gratitude for a legal heritage that bestows greater than nor-
mal benefits. It is no objection to say that the lawyer earned
these privileges through hard work and high economic invest-
ment. While true, and while lawyers do deserve personal credit
for hard work and study, such recognition does not alter the
advantage of opportunity. For this aura surrounding a life in the
law, the lawyer should feel grateful.
Far more important than the concrete social advantages of
law are the possibilities a lawyer acquires for a meaningful profes-
sional and personal life. The law is a worthy profession because
it serves the intrinsic good of justice. This does not mean that a
lawyer's institutional roles are all justified, but it does mean that
the legal profession follows guiding norms. Unlike many forms
of work, legal work has an overarching purpose as its measure.
All of the particulars of legal life can be assessed accordingly.
Measured in the context of integrity, the law contains a contin-
gent promise of moral progress within itself. Of course, the skep-
tical end of the epistemic polarity is also pronounced in the law
because lawyers effectuate the diverse ends of others, which
restrains their moral liberty of judgment to some degree. Thus,
law operates at the extremes of truth and uncertainty, making
integral balance more challenging than it even is ordinarily. The
value ofjustice needs content that the profession supplies collec-
tively, but justice must ultimately enlist the reflective judgments
of every lawyer. Yet, it is a privilege to have some standard of
goodness by which to calibrate the epistemic equilibrium of legal
integrity.
Besides having more opportunities than most to achieve pro-
fessional integrity, lawyers also wield more ability to shape collec-
tive moral identity. Because law is so central in a contemporary
society that has few other shared cultural moorings, the lawyer is
privileged to effectuate social changes that few have the power
even to touch. With this rare capacity, lawyers can influence, to
small or large extent, legal reform and justice in particular cases.
While contemporary conditions, including shrinking public
resources for legal work and a narrowing sense of judicial roles,
have diminished opportunities for changing society through law,
76. See Walker, supra note 19, at 192, 204, 210.
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lawyers far more than most participate in a heritage of empower-
ment. For this they should feel both pride and responsibility.
Even today's lawyer encounters more opportunities to serve
people and causes with significant need than most ever experi-
ence. Every argument and interaction determines whether the
law will be read according to its letter, or more expansively, for
improvement of the community. The lawyer can do much in
counseling, as well as in court, to shape the reach of the law, even
when the language of the law is constraining.
There is never a shortage of satisfying work for those lawyers
who can make time to donate their expertise to represent other-
wise voiceless clients or causes. This chance to serve offers ways
to build the lawyer's generosity and caring character, and it
brings meaning to the lawyer's everyday and overall professional
life. Thus, the lawyer should feel grateful to those she serves and
for her fortune in encountering moments for giving.77 These
rare opportunities have the potential to enhance professional
esteem, self-respect, and spiritual satisfaction. The lawyer's mind
remains active and engaged with important matters that can
"make a difference" in the community. Few experience such
empowerment in their work lives, and this a reflective lawyer
should recognize and appreciate.
Such appreciation has abstract ideas like justice as its object,
perhaps the best example of legal gratitude unattached to spe-
cific objects. Justice is a good example of something received but
not owned or retained completely, a condition some also have
attributed to gratitude.78 It makes no sense to possess something
like justice, which only has meaning in relation to others.
Whether the lawyer views justice as substantive or distributive,
natural or a function of positive law, he must recognize the cen-
trality of the idea to relations both among humans and between
them and the non-human world. The lawyer has special connec-
tion with this ubiquitous and powerful idea as its steward. The
lawyer holds such an abstract gift without ownership and has
some unusual power to pass it back as a partially realized ideal.79
This translates into policy influence beyond that of the aver-
age political citizen and special opportunities to improve society
that lawyers should not squander. Citizen potential straddles law-
yers' professional and personal lives. Authentic caring forjustice
forces its way into extra-legal activities. Grateful for special
77. See Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 152.
78. See Camenisch, supra note 11, at 9, 12 (describing never complete
gratitude for gifts not possessed).
79. See id.
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responsibilities for justice, the lawyer is inherently motivated
toward political and other community work.
D. Gratitude and Adversary Practice
Given the wide berth lawyer gratitude fills, the question
arises whether the Buddhist-like view of thankfulness to enemies
may be relevant to legal life where lawyers regularly engage in
adversarial and sometimes hostile interactions. Patrick Fitzgerald
might say that lawyers should thank their opponents for the chal-
lenges that competitive practice poses that spawn pathways to
enlightened growth."0 While I accept that lawyers should be
grateful for learning opportunities and tests of fortitude, I do not
believe that the adversaries themselves are typically the appropri-
ate subject. Rather, the legal experiences that spur lawyers to
perfect their craft and cultivate personal traits like patience and
fortitude are the sources of gratitude. This notion of grateful-
ness for circumstances and events is not overly abstract and
makes great sense once gratitude is released from particular
benefactors.
Sometimes, however, the persons themselves who test the
lawyer's wits and character can be the subject of direct gratitude.
When adversaries execute their duties without malice in high
performance of their role, the recipient may admire and respect
opponents for their craft, persistence, and forbearance."' The
lawyer might absorb such modeling and feel grateful even
though the adversary intends no personal benefit. Or, lawyers
who maintain cordiality throughout antagonistic circumstances
can thank the opponent who retains dignity and respectfulness.
A case that challenges a lawyer's moral sensibilities also can
afford moral growth. An associate who pursued environmentalist
values into law school and practice might feel constrained by
educational debt, family responsibilities, and a competitive job
market to represent corporations in environmental defense. The
disappointed associate might discover, however, opportunities to
advise clients compellingly on the relationship between compli-
ance and enlightened corporate self-interest. He or she might
persuade company representatives that their reputation with
environmental regulators and the community is more valuable
than short-term cost savings. The associate might even convince
the client to innovate beyond compliance to promote good will.
80. See Fitzgerald, supra note 7.
81. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705,
738 (1998) (discussing complimenting the opponent's lawyer).
LAWYERS AND GRATITUDE
He or she might gradually soften some stereotypes about corpo-
rate leaders' singular dedication to the "bottom line" and acquire
respect for them as moral beings trying to do their best for soci-
ety. While only a naive lawyer might expect such progress at
every turn, a lawyer mired in cynicism might miss opportunities
for moral nourishment altogether. Generalized gratitude will
not dissolve moral distress, but can illuminate crevices leading
from the cave.
E. How To Manifest Gratitude
To whom, and how, should the lawyer express the many
components of legal gratitude, direct and diffuse? Of course, the
individuals who facilitate the lawyer's meaningful work deserve
special appreciation and reciprocity. It is not always possible,
however, to trace opportunities to particular benefactors. Even if
the grateful lawyer can single out such influential people, it
might not be possible or useful to reciprocate. How a lawyer
could bestow similar benefits on a benefactor is not always obvi-
ous. The person who provided such gifts as mentoring might
already possess analogous or greater chances to effect social
changes, which is what placed him in a position to give in the
first place. Indeed, the benefactor's gratitude for his own legal
blessings might be the very thing that motivated him to assist
someone else.
Thus, even a lawyer seeking to give back something specific
like knowledge or skill has more flexible parameters for moral
reciprocity than a strictly quid pro quo pattern suggests. The
most suitable return might be to someone besides the benefac-
tor, if even the giver is an identifiable individual. The best form
of return also might be open-ended. For a gift of meaningful
influence, the ideal return might be the thoughtful exercise of
that influence in every moment, so not to waste what was
bestowed. The lawyer who can contribute to justice has a duty to
reflect on the meaning ofjustice and how best to implement it in
particular circumstances. That lawyer will assess each significant
course of action for its just or unjust tendencies and muster the
courage to reject means and ends that clearly do not satisfy this
overarching professional purpose. These duties are ongoing and
through regular reflection should become reflective habits
ingrained in the lawyer's character-should become a tempera-
ment for justice that transcends professional boundaries.
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While legal gratitude carries obligations, no one can com-
mand a morally appropriate emotional response.82 Creativity
and thought should guide the thankful lawyer in discharging
obligations in the right time, place, and manner. This is one rea-
son why mandatory service programs may not be desirable for
attorneys despite a strong moral obligation to provide pro bono
work and facilitate access to justice.8' Ajust temperament will be
sustainable only if moral emotions are permitted to thrive and
are not suppressed through coercion or perceptions of external
incentives.84 A lawyer's gratitude is perhaps the most powerful
internal stimulant to service.
George Klosko has objected that gratitude is a weak
motivator because it yields no distinct, concrete obligation to
act.85 Klosko claims that political gratitude can not insure obedi-
ence to law, for example, precisely because it creates open-ended
obligations that can be satisfied in flexible ways only if opportuni-
ties arise.86 It may be that gratitude is mismatched with a com-
mand to obey anything. In philosophical terms, gratitude
generates "imperfect" duties that can be implemented flexibly, as
opposed to "perfect duties" that have clear objects. 8 7
In contrast to Klosko, I believe that latitude and diffusion
render gratitude far from feeble, but a particularly valuable and
potent moral response. The elasticity forces the grateful person
into sensitive reflection about how to repay debts that can never
be entirely discharged.88 Gratitude is a self-replenishing emo-
tion, like love, that revives each time a person gratefully assists
others for simply having this opportunity for meaningful life.
This sustainable emotion has energy that manifests in diverse
and creative ways, at unexpected times when gratitude is not tied
to immediate events or particular persons.
Such a revitalizing response is an invaluable resource for
lawyers who operate in a codified, rule-bound ethical world.89
82. One can expect generosity and condemn the person who does not
show it, but ordering it would be counter-productive and diminish positive
moral emotion and consequent action.
83. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro
Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459 (2001).
84. See Lepper et al., supra note 22.
85. George Klosko, Political Obligation and Gratitude, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
352, 355 (1989).
86. Id. at 355-56.
87. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS 39 n.9 (Thomas K. Abbot trans., Liberal Arts Press 1949) (1785).
88. See Camenisch, supra note 11, at 9, 12.
89. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater
for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987).
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Their training in parsing statutes tilts them inexorably toward
reading statute-like ethical codes in a similar vein. The trend
away from aspiration toward rules aggravates a burrowing atti-
tude and actually suppresses ethical reflection.9" When lawyers
look to the "law of ethics" for guidance, they tend to lament the
sham of illusory answers or languish in the comfort of pat direc-
tion. Imperfect duties are an antidote to over-reliance on rules.
Open moral terrain nurtures aspiration in lawyers and a search-
ing posture of reflection. Generalized gratitude fosters the epi-
stemic suspension between moral certainty and doubt that I have
identified with moral integrity. It preserves space to translate the
virtue into thoughtful conduct.
F. Misplaced Legal Gratitude
Lauding diffuse lawyer gratitude does not cancel its risks,
however. While absence of the virtue is more serious, excessive
gratitude is also problematic. The "happy-go-lucky" lawyer would
be a rare aberration of the grateful temperament, but such a law-
yer would suffer from critical blindness to the moral perils of an
adversarial profession and be overly vulnerable to hostile turns.
Many lawyers worry about underestimating danger from the
opposition and failing to advocate effectively for clients' legiti-
mate interests. In their zeal to avoid this plight, they become a
caricature. The more familiar and perilous lawyer-the amoral
lawyer-is deficient in gratitude and loses the ability to "see" or
care about moral problems.
Quid pro quo gratitude also can be misplaced. Feeling
indebted to one's professional colleagues can lead to casual obe-
dience and conformist thinking within a legal organization, for
example.9 A patronage system of relations can germinate from
institutional factors like personal debts to co-workers, especially
superiors. This can cause even good lawyers to overlook wrongs
or prefer benign explanations in the face of serious misconduct
or harmful inaction.92 Over-partisanship in the lawyer-client
relationship is a well-discussed phenomenon of excess. 93 Grati-
tude toward clients and their business can slide into general
90. See id. at 336-37.
91. See, e.g.,JOHN P. SABINI & MAURY SILVER, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE
84-85 (1982).
92. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICs 369 (3d ed.
2001) (describing associate overlooking clear misconduct by partner and
mentor).
93. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 2, at 3-39; Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
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moral blindness and suppress harms to other people and the
legal system.
Gratitude for one's profession can create an insular and
static, yet pervasive, mentality. Lawyers communicate with peers
in a private, often exclusive, language. This can distance lawyers
from those they serve, contributing at least to deficiencies in cli-
ent communication and at worst to smothering client autonomy.
A lawyer so distant can lose the ability to interpret ordinary social
terrain and muster the moral and human resources necessary to
solve problems creatively and ethically. A lawyer so dissociated
thus loses some competence and humanity that comes from care
and tending in everyday relationships. As positive as professional
gratitude can be, it can lapse into the vice of over-gratitude with-
out monitoring and active moral calibration.
Problems also arise because gratitude is not a complete vir-
tue. It needs to be balanced with other traits that temper it in
certain contexts. For example, the lawyer who feels indebted to a
regular business client must summon courage to resist actions
that, although legal, perpetrate harm to the environment. An
associate grateful to workplace mentors must not lose motivation
to spread generosity beyond the firm despite the insular
demands and rewards of daily employment. That associate
should recognize that good mentoring is a fortunate act, not
always evenly available to women and lawyers of color who suffer
from a shortage of role models in positions of power. 4 More
pressing virtues like courage and humility should overpower fac-
ile gratitude that will wreak harm or promote passivity about
broad, systemic reforms.
Individual virtues balance each other through careful practi-
cal judgment about their proper configuration in various situa-
tions. A virtue approach should not be severed from a principle-
based ethic that hones contextual judgment and perfects it over
time. Epistemic integrity merges the two approaches. One habit
of an integrally virtuous person is daily reflection and equilibra-
tion of epistemic tensions. With time and practice, this process
becomes more reflexive and almost spontaneous for a person of
virtue.95
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 29; Wasserstrom, supra note 71, at
11-12.
94. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 81, at n.144.
95. Aristotle insisted that people learn to be good by behaving well over
time, similar to the harpist who learns to play the instrument well through prac-
tice. ARiSTOTLE, supra note 40, at 28-29.
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V. ENCOURAGING GRATITUDE
A. The Legal Workplace
Today's legal practice is not conducive to developing grati-
tude in the broader and diffuse dimensions that promote coop-
eration, generosity, and devotion to justice. First, the pace of
typical work is a problem. Private law firms, particularly, expect
slavish billable hours that leave little time for family life, let alone
avocations or even moments to reflect.96 Judges also, whose deci-
sions could benefit from free-floating gratitude that spawns
empathy and compassion, are tied to crowded dockets.97 Those
who work for legal services, public defense, and other public
interest programs are underpaid and burdened with caseloads
that do not encourage meticulous attention or sustained rela-
tionships.9" Such conditions are antithetical to the reflective
atmosphere that nourishes a lawyer's gratitude and its proper
exercise.
This unreflective, some would say amoral, environment even
drives lawyers out of the profession altogether. The departed are
perhaps the very lawyers who most need pervasive moral emo-
tions like gratitude to provide sustenance in professional life.
There is irony, to be sure, in claiming that these sensitive lawyers
could contribute most to creating a grateful profession, since
they are disgruntled and even despairing. But many who are dis-
satisfied lament the lack of meaning and reward in the profes-
sion.99 They are perhaps the seekers who could convert their
disenchantment into significant reform and their yearnings into
improved collective character.
Still more pernicious is the idea that morally engaged law-
yers actually threaten the profession. While complying with pro-
fessional codes does maintain institutional reputations by
avoiding disciplinary sanctions, the deeply reflective atmosphere
advocated here could disrupt a lawyer's ability to act within role
constraints, which, in private practice at least, would impede the
profit-making goal of legal corporations. Thus, one must wonder
whether amoral lawyers fare best in the modern legal work-
96. KRONMAN, supra note 59, at 281; Gillers, supra note 63, at 117-28;
Schiltz, supra note 81, at 725-26.
97. Schiltz, supra note 81, at 745 (lamenting the loss of judicial mentors).
98. See Charles J. Ogeltree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1240 (1993) (discussing heavy
public defender caseloads).
99. See e.g., Schiltz, supra note 81, at 725-26.
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place.'00 After all, they are freer to accept assignments without
experiencing value conflicts, and they are better able to concen-
trate on technical proficiency without moral distractions. They
scrupulously avoid ethical troubles through shunning probing
questions about their work that could gnaw at motivation and
efficiency. They are content to accept an ethical universe
defined by professional bodies like the American Bar Association
and, if anything, clamor for clearer rules that make compliance
easier.101 Their gratitude encompasses the existing professional
and legal template and the rewards it offers to those who operate
within given frameworks. °2 Such gratitude is more targeted
than diffuse, more self-interested than generous, and ultimately
more constraining than creative. Perhaps this is a portrait of the
highly effective lawyer.
Let us resist that conclusion. On the level of collective self-
interest alone, more diffusely grateful lawyers may perform best.
Expansive human resources contribute to successful lawyering.
An effective lawyer aims to facilitate client autonomy, which sum-
mons ambitious skills like listening with care, fusing technical
expertise with clients' expressed needs and interests, and pursu-
ing constructive dialogue with opponents. Free-floating grati-
tude pushes a lawyer's perspective outward, making him more
perceptive and finely attuned to the human dramas unfolding.
An authentically thankful lawyer cares about case outcomes for
all of the people deeply affected, and he seeks to leave situations
improved over his entry onto the scene. He leaves a gender
imprint that does not foment resentment of lawyers.
A grateful lawyer is also a more effective member of the legal
workplace. She is motivated to return accolades to the employ-
ing group with whom she shares a moral fate and to leave a posi-
tive mark on the profession as a whole. Importantly, she
recognizes that her moral identity is inseparable from the collec-
tives of which she is part. This is so even for newcomers who lack
executive authority or are scant participants in organizational his-
tory. All of her affiliations change who she is as a person, and
joining a group and remaining within its fold are morally signifi-
cant decisions that only she can make. "Generativity," or the con-
100. A former student who tried practicing in a well-reputed Wall Street
firm arrived at this conclusion.
101. See Loder, supra note 89, at 311, 319-21.
102. My students tend to view the legal system as an impermeable
"container" forcing them to operate within rigid professional constraints. They
believe that lawyers lack the power to change things much.
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cern with leaving a positive legacy for successors,' 03 becomes part
of the personality of a deeply grateful person. A lawyer's moral
personality is bound to the collective destiny of the workplace.
Such a lawyer is loyal to the group character with which her iden-
tity is intertwined.
Gratitude spurs a sense of ever falling short in obligations
and prompts an ongoing search for opportunities to return
thanks by improving collective character. Faithfulness cements
relations that may have begun on the basis of self-interest and
sustains those relations for their inherent worth." 4 Properly
tuned loyalty is a factor that increases productivity, creativity, and
ethics in the workplace.' 0 5 In short, work satisfaction improves
both the business and moral "bottom line" in most cases.
Law organizations thus have strong reasons to re-examine
some of the work conditions that contribute to lawyer dissatisfac-
tion and bitter ingratitude. While short-term benefits may
accrue to private firms from long hours, peer competition, and
emphasis on "rainmaking," the costs in morale over time dimin-
ish the potential for practice at the highest, most creative level.
This impedes organizational competitiveness. Public organiza-
tions such as courts and government agencies can also suffer
from inhumane conditions even though profits are not their par-
amount concern. Disgruntled employees, and those suffering
malaise, do not perform at their best and are more prone to drift
into ethically thoughtless behavior, or worse, diminished care
and attention.
The profession itself has a collective self-interest in altering
professional requirements and expectations to facilitate self-con-
scious gratitude. Lawyers who feel diffusely grateful for their
chosen work are naturally motivated to greater compassion and
generosity. Collectively, these changes in affect and behavior can
only bolster the profession's reputation and temper people's
reluctance to seek legal advice. Social and professional support
through bar associations, Inns of Court, and substance abuse
groups already serve lawyers, but the profession should attempt
to widen the sphere of organizations dedicated to lawyers' moral
lives and qualms. Increasing public education about law is
another way to improve understanding about the inherent
clashes of role with societal moral consensus. Already, some
103. Dan P. McAdams et al., Stories of Commitment: The Psychosocial Con-
struction of Generative Lives, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 678, 678 (1997).
104. Id.
105. See Schiltz, supra note 81, at 744-45 (lamenting the loss of loyalty
and friendships in modern law firms).
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courts take live proceedings to various public settings and invite
observation. 10 6 Some law schools provide legal education out-
reach to local public schools.
B. Law Schools
It is extremely important to instill early habits of moral
reflection in law students. Law schools vary in this effort.
Although all schools offer courses in regulatory legal ethics, this
is decidedly insufficient and, indeed, may actually suppress moral
deliberation through over-reliance on rules. A positivist empha-
sis on the content of codes and other forms of ethical regulation
encourages students to see their ethical responsibilities in a legal-
istic way. This is particularly so because codes increasingly resem-
ble statutes, and legal training prepares students to traverse the
outer boundaries of coverage.
Although regulatory ethics training is clearly necessary, a
better approach also involves interdisciplinary education in
moral analysis, not attached to regulatory questions.107 Students
benefit from identifying and examining the philosophical, psy-
chological, and cultural foundations of ethical issues. They learn
from comparing ethical issues facing professionals, not limited to
lawyers.' °8 Such cross-disciplinary discussions prompt deeper
thinking about the ethical complexities and responsibilities
endemic to professional life. The application of social science
methodologies can also improve students' grasp of their profes-
sion in cultural terms. The tools of ethics and social sciences can
apply to legal analysis generally, prompting students to think
about the ethical underpinnings of law and its social contexts.
Besides expanding thought processes through the insights of
other disciplines, such perspectives education encourages habits
of reflection, curiosity, and refined reasoning that can survive in
the workplace. The pressures of daily work may ultimately
dampen these reflexes and curiosities, but effective resistance to
that outcome minimally requires positive experience with a dif-
ferent model.
Beyond its intellectual value, interdisciplinary education is
normative. Examining diverse perspectives on law, especially in a
small class setting, exposes students to viewpoints they might oth-
106. For example, the Supreme Courts of Vermont and New Hampshire
periodically conduct actual proceedings at law schools and other public places.
107. For example, I teach a seminar in comparative professional ethics at
my law school and also have taught it in a liberal arts graduate program.
108. My seminar, Moral Philosophy for Professionals, covers such issues
as the professional relationship, confidentiality, paternalism, deception, and
professional generosity.
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erwise shun or scorn. Dialogue can foster empathic listening and
promote respect for others whose ideas are foreign. Ultimately,
the participant on a path toward integrity may apply this input to
challenge and perhaps modify his own formerly entrenched
ideas. Greater appreciation of diverse perspectives prepares the
student to question law and, ideally, motivates her to reform it.
Such exposure crucially prepares students to work with lawyers
and clients who do not share their cultural outlook. Law teach-
ers suffer from their own version of short-sighted vice in their
headstrong dedication to academic advancement through schol-
arship that minimizes teaching and mentoring of future
lawyers.1 °9
In teaching, professors are too glib about the permeable
boundaries of law and too eager to judge positions by persuasive-
ness, not merit. This orientation alienates students from their
normative bearings and creates anxiety and depression.'
Teachers tend to dismiss such reactions, striving to startle their
charges from innocence into the "grown up" world of lawyers.
A classroom experience that deflects emotion, and which
reserves questions about justice to students' private musings,
takes a hidden toll on the moral future of lawyers. A sense of
powerlessness facilitates a positivist attitude toward the legal sys-
tem as a rigid and impermeable "container." This obscures the
extent to which every lawyer, every day, shapes the framework
within which he or she functions. Instead of promoting critical
reflection on law and legal institutions, suppressing normative
discussion in instruction releases students from ethical responsi-
bility and victimizes them to outside forces. A morally passive
stance conceals opportunities for gratitude that provide meaning
and motivation. It dampens legal integrity as epistemic struggle.
Advising is another missed opportunity in law school.
Directing students exclusively to "core" bar courses is one mis-
step in moral aspiration. So is shifting the emotional toll of legal
education to professionals and resources outside of the student
and teacher relationship. Although a teacher is not equipped to
provide psychological counseling, a teacher is uniquely situated
to address the moral ennui that too often germinates in the study
of law. Who, after all, is better positioned to provide such profes-
sional moral guidance?
109. See Schiltz, supra note 81, at 753, 773-76.
110. See, e.g., JACK & JACK, supra note 70, at 45-46 (explaining how law
training breaks down patterns of perception and valuation).
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C. Specific Measures To Promote Gratitude
Professional institutions can assist in inculcating and perpet-
uating reflective habits. Law schools can do much to bring broad
ideals of law into the classroom, the faculty office, and the career
planning department. Continuing legal education programs
also can incorporate broader discussions than is typical in the
practice-oriented study of topical issues in legal specialties.
Recent work on law and religious faith is only one type of
expanded perspective. Many practitioners crave the kind of
intellectual and moral discussions that led them to the law ini-
tially, and the Bar should cherish this interest, not let it atrophy.
The skills and values that emerge from such expansive reflection
can keep motivation and meaning alive, which might reduce pro-
fessional flight of those ethically disaffected lawyers who might
most inspire professional activism.
The workplace itself needs deep change, however, if these
efforts are to have sustaining force. Every legal employee shares
responsibility to press for a more value-conscious working envi-
ronment-not an easy task given the competitive pressures dis-
cussed earlier. Although lawyers give lip service to the idea that
ethics and good business practices are complementary, this usu-
ally refers to egoistic concerns with maintaining a saleable corpo-
rate reputation and freedom from costly ethical sanctions. The
deeper, more transformative moral consciousness considered
here is harder to justify in terms of marketability. On the other
hand, the payoffs of a more loyal and ethically engaged
workforce are neither imaginary nor transitory, especially given
repeated documentation of significant work dissatisfaction and
even despair.
A lawyer can return generalized gratitude in persistent,
albeit risky, efforts to reshape the profession and the local work
environment. She can screen potential work sites for their ethi-
cal as well as material accoutrements."' In avoiding "metaphysi-
111. This is a challenge despite career guides providing plentiful infor-
mation on types of practice and interviewing. See, e.g., GARY A. MUNNEKE, THE
LEGAL CAREER GUIDE: FROM LAW STUDENT TO LAWYER 77 (4th ed. 2002); KIMM
ALAYNE WALTON, GUERILLA TACTICS FOR GETTING THE LEGAL JOB OF YOUR
DREAMS (1999). Several internet websites provide information on specific firms,
including size, departments, and regular clients, but offer virtually no informa-
tion on policies, codes, mission, or work demands. See, e.g., The American Law-
yer On the Web Home Page, http://www.americanlawyer.com (last visited Apr.
3, 2006); Law.com Home Page, http://www.law.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2006);
Westlaw Home Page, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2006); Mar-
tindale.com Home Page, http://www.martindale.com (last visited Apr. 3,
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cal taint" to her own integrity,1 12 she can apply her gratitude to
protect the collective integrity of her colleagues and profession.
She can instigate normative discussions of law in the workplace
and let her superiors know that this is important to her well-
being. She can press for pro bono and law reform projects that
convert gratitude into concrete generosity. She can voice con-
cern with cases and projects that present ethical problems and
refuse to participate in those relatively rare cases that do not
meet a minimum ethical threshold." 3 She can express her con-
cerns about working conditions for lawyers with family responsi-
bilities to children and elders and organize the collective support
of associates and affected partners in this endeavor. The same
concern with work conditions also affects her general energy,
curiosity, and enthusiasm. Some space to pursue political, artis-
tic, and social avocations sustains moral aspiration and informs a
life in the law. All of these measures are expressions of diffuse
gratitude transferred to a workplace character that the lawyer
imagines morally better. Her return gift is thought, time, and
personal risk absorbed for the sake of the collective ethical iden-
tity. If these efforts fail or, worse, if retaliation results, the law-
yer's grateful disposition can bolster the courage and resolve to
flee to a more hopeful setting.
CONCLUSION
Since genuine gratitude can never be fully repaid,114 our
lawyer should never become resigned to ethical shortcomings in
her profession. She should tap whatever reservoir of collective
virtue she finds and consciously stoke its gratitude store. Upon
failure, revived examination of her fortunes and capacities
should be enough to remind her of opportunities remaining to
spread her bounty. Her successes should replenish and enlarge
her gratitude when she recalls her rare empowerment. She can
rally grateful character to the lawyer's deepest work. Few can
dare to press the gates of justice. She realizes that she is one of
the lucky few.
2006); The National Law Journal Home Page, http://www.nlj.com (last visited
Apr. 3, 2006).
112. See KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 26 (E.B. Aston
trans., 2001) (1948) (describing co-responsibility for others' crimes about
which one knows and fails to prevent).
113. I think that every lawyer should be allowed several "peremptory chal-
lenges" to refuse work that deeply offends the lawyer's morality following care-
ful deliberation.
114. See, e.g., Camenisch, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing "never quite
completed business of gift exchange").
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